The Euro Zone s Default Position

Predictions of outright default are far fetched.

The costs of default depend on how messy things become when payments stop.

Credit Default Swaps on Trial

On January 22, the ECB took decisive action to protect the eurozone from a possible Greek default.

As prime minister, Yushchenko saved his country from financial default in early 2000.

The ECB s new policy was designed to protect the euro from the consequences of a Greek exit or default.

Avoiding default may be possible, but it will not be easy.

Nor does Greece s default history inspire confidence.

If there is more equity, then logically debt should be cheaper, as the company (or bank) is better insulated from default.

Credit default swaps (CDS) are particularly suspicious instruments.

The gaps between German bond yields and Italian and Greek yields are at record levels. The price of default insurance has tripled.

The price of default insurance has tripled.

Indeed, Argentina s economy would be better off today if Argentina had borrowed in terms linked to its GDP decades ago rather than at an interest rate denominated in dollars.

Like most Americans, China s leaders believe that the US will ultimately dodge the bullet of an outright default.

Its foreign debt would have declined in line with its GDP, thus sheltering the economy from default and economic disaster.

Argentina's collapse incited the largest default in history.

The most recent threat of a US debt default has been avoided, but only temporarily.

The benefits of default are the savings on future payments by the government especially payments to non residents, who cannot vote.

(Indeed, by most accounts, it is about to default.)

If Greece defaults, an enormous amount of speculation will be possible.

Indeed, CDSs are blamed as one of the main causes of the financial crisis.

By effectively defaulting on a deposit insurance guarantee through its actions in Cyprus, the eurozone backtracked on the planned banking union.

The IMF is preparing a bailout estimated at 20 billion to keep Argentina from defaulting on loans to foreign investors.

Instead of defaulting, countries arranged rescue packages with the IMF.

But markets are already assigning a high probability to a Greek default.

But, for the most part, the sovereign default process is slow motion Kabuki theater.

But after a government funding default in 1998, the much delayed public funding of the project finally stopped.

In South America, the big crunch came after Russia's default of August 18, 1998.

The consequences of a US default have rightly been described with growing alarm as the risk increases.

No one knew the real value of credit default swaps and of the various tranches of collateralized debt obligations.

There, too, governments widely guaranteed private sector debt, and then proceeded to default on it.

Some form of default will almost surely be forced upon Greece, and this may be the most preferable alternative.

Can Greece, with the EFSF s help, obtain debt relief while avoiding default?

The healthy borrowers worried that creditors would demand higher rates if the penalties for default softened.

The risk of default or debt restructuring induces creditors to be more careful in their lending decisions.

Something started to cause investors to fear that Greek debt had a slightly higher risk of eventual default. Lower demand for Greek debt caused its price to fall, meaning that its yield in terms of market interest rates rose.

How long does default last before the country can reach an agreement with its creditors?

Something started to cause investors to fear that Greek debt had a slightly higher risk of eventual default.

Now Tsipras thinks he holds another trump card Europe s fear of a Greek default.

August 2 came and went, with no default, but, three days later, a Friday, Standard amp

Since overcoming default, Argentina has been strengthening its position as a target for foreign investment.

Our borrowing costs were skyrocketing, and we were facing possible default.

A debt buyback is something of a Catch 22 to succeed in inducing a haircut, it needs to profit from the default fears that it intends to alleviate.

When Argentina defaulted in the 1890's, European investors simply discovered a new fashion investment in Russia.