Nuclear deterrence ensures global peace.

Withdrawal of these weapons would not mean the end of nuclear deterrence for Europe, as deterrence will remain necessary until the last nuclear weapon is dismantled.

Withdrawal of these weapons would not mean the end of nuclear deterrence for Europe, as deterrence will remain necessary until the last nuclear weapon is dismantled.

Israel s nuclear deterrence is its ultimate defense against an existential threat.

But, among states, even nuclear deterrence was more complex than it first looked, and that is doubly true of deterrence in the cyber domain.

Now the worldwide wave of support for a full ban on nuclear weapons, or nuclear zero, is being transformed into a debate about nuclear deterrence.

No one knows her opinion on the Middle East, terrorism, nuclear deterrence, and international security.

The second message is that Cold War nuclear deterrence doctrine is irrelevant to today s world.

In that event, there remains the hope that mutual nuclear deterrence will promote mutual common sense.

Unfortunately, the doctrine of nuclear deterrence is contagious, making non proliferation more difficult and raising new risks that nuclear weapons will be used.

But if the two countries fail to overcome their bad old habits of mutual suspicion, their remaining quite powerful nuclear arsenals will continue to serve deterrence and self deterrence.

The NPR affirms the policy of extended nuclear deterrence, under which the US retains the option to employ nuclear weapons to defend its allies.

The second message is that Cold War nuclear deterrence doctrine is irrelevant to today s world. So long as nuclear weapons remain, states can justify maintaining a minimum nuclear deterrent capability.

Israel could then mimic other nuclear armed states by flexing its capacity through announcement and transparent nuclear deployment on land and sea, thereby promoting deterrence.

It is a mistake, however, to believe that extended deterrence depends on parity in numbers of nuclear weapons.

By limiting strategic missile defense, the old treaty provides a certain predictability of deterrence for all nuclear weapon states.

By limiting strategic missile defense, the old treaty provides a certain predictability of deterrence for all nuclear weapon states.

Unlike the nuclear age, when it comes to deterrence in the cyber era, one size does not fit all.

But the sole purpose of retaining some degree of deterrence will be to deter the use of nuclear weapons.

As events in Pakistan illustrate, the spread of nuclear technology does not extend the stability that comes with mutual deterrence.

Europe perhaps benefited more than any other part of the world from nuclear deterrence, because it helped to preserve peace during the Cold War and prevented nuclear proliferation.

Nuclear deterrence and mutually assured destruction would be passé only if we assumed that we people, countries, and humankind at large had become so ideal and humane that we no longer needed self deterrence.

If the US can defend itself against nuclear attack, the Russians argue, their retaliatory capacity will be eroded and deterrence undone.

Gaza and the Failure of Deterrence

It is not naïve to believe that nuclear deterrence is both fragile operationally, and of thoroughly dubious utility in sustaining the peace.

This deterrence logic produces a snowball effect.

The most important function of nuclear weapons during the Cold War though little spoken of at the time proved to be self deterrence.

Some argue that it could become the basis of stable nuclear deterrence in the region, analogous to the nuclear standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War.

The Japanese fear that the credibility of American extended deterrence will be weakened if the US decreases its nuclear forces to parity with China.

Olmert seemed to be reminding the Iranians of the hard realities of nuclear deterrence Iran may join the nuclear club someday, but it will return to the Stone Age if it uses those weapons against a country that has a far more advanced nuclear arsenal.

A year ago, a new strategic arms treaty between Russia and the US was signed in the same city. Now the worldwide wave of support for a full ban on nuclear weapons, or nuclear zero, is being transformed into a debate about nuclear deterrence.

More than any other government official, he was responsible for institutionalizing the key strategic doctrine of the nuclear age, deterrence, otherwise known as mutual assured destruction.

I firmly doubt the need to dispense with deterrence.

Have we forgotten all about the theory of deterrence?

The problem, of course, is that deterrence sometimes fails.

Proliferators must know that the NATO allies are unwavering in their commitment to collective defense, including nuclear deterrence. Confronted with the spread of missile technology, and unpredictable regimes and leaders, we owe it to our populations to complement our deterrence capabilities with an effective missile defense capability.

But, for a country that has had little faith in deterrence when it comes to existential nuclear threats, relying on it now would mark a new, uncomfortable bet.

The first is to rely on deterrence and live with an Iran that has a small nuclear arsenal or the ability to assemble one with little advance notice.

So long as the world remains a dangerous place with several nuclear weapons states, Obama must reassure its allies about the credibility of American guarantees of extended deterrence.

Absent a dramatic improvement in the Middle East s grim political landscape, the failure of deterrence would bring the sum of all the fears of our nuclear age upon us.

Strategic studies of the cyber domain resemble nuclear strategy in the 1950s analysts are still not clear about the meaning of offense, defense, deterrence, escalation, norms, and arms control.

The first option should be deterrence of further aggression through diplomacy.

But deterrence requires a credible threat of response against an attacker.

Now, one way of dealing with this problem is by deterrence.

Responses to cyber war include a form of interstate deterrence through denial and entanglement, offensive capabilities, and designs for rapid network and infrastructure recovery if deterrence fails.