Rating the Raters

On this view, if investors were able to take raters to court, raters incentives would improve.

Google uses human raters as part of their algorithm?

One proposed approach would reduce the significance of the raters opinions.

But to make ratings work, the raters need to be rated.

For example, raters and just regular users don't always recognize spam.

Too often, the raters seem content to follow rather than lead sentiment.

Well, such a mechanism would indeed reduce raters negative incentives to compete with one another to please issuers of securities, and to pursue innovations and improvements that enable raters to serve issuers better. But it would strengthen raters positive incentives to compete with one another to produce accurate ratings, and to pursue innovations and improvements that enable raters to achieve that far more socially beneficial goal.

The board would be allowed to base its choices on raters past performance.

But it would strengthen raters positive incentives to compete with one another to produce accurate ratings, and to pursue innovations and improvements that enable raters to achieve that far more socially beneficial goal.

You used the word raters, so let me drill down on that a little bit.

Under the Senate s approach, regulators would create rules under which an independent regulatory board would choose raters.

There is thus no substitute for providing raters with incentives to provide as accurate a rating as they can.

Raters are really not used to influence Google's rankings directly, so let's walk through exactly how they are used.

I work on web spam, but I can basically paraphrase the process because that's where the human raters come into play.

So there are 100s of raters who are paid to, given a url, say is this good stuff? Is this bad stuff?

Disappointment about the raters performance, and skepticism about the effectiveness of regulation, has led to calls to eliminate any regulatory reliance on ratings.

This can be done by making raters profits depend not on satisfying the issuers that select them, but on performing well for investors.

This can be done by making raters profits depend not on satisfying the issuers that select them, but on performing well for investors. If raters profits depend on such performance on the accuracy of their ratings the profit motive would turn from a source of perverse incentives to a provider of beneficial incentives.

For such a mechanism to work well, it must link the number of assignments won by raters, and thus their compensation, to appropriate measures of their performance.

So I've made other videos that talks about how Google takes action and is willing to take manual action on web spam, but you're talking about raters.

Really the human raters that are used within the evaluation group are used to say we think this would be better or we think this would be worse.

Second wife, second best

Second word... second word... ear?

If raters profits depend on such performance on the accuracy of their ratings the profit motive would turn from a source of perverse incentives to a provider of beneficial incentives.

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University level (second stage) second cycle

One frame per second. Two frames per second. Four frames per second.

If ratings are not backed by the force of law, so the argument goes, regulators need not worry about rating quality and can leave the monitoring of raters to the market.

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Credit rating agencies, which play an important role in modern capital markets, completely failed in the years preceding the financial crisis. What is needed is an effective mechanism for rating the raters.

They don't want second standard, second quality outputs.

Second, Iraq.

Second story.

Second argument

The second.

Second Reading

Second edition.

... the second?

Second Edition.