Housing prices peaked in 2006, and equity prices peaked in 2007.

The potential vulnerability of Western exports and equity prices is massive.

In 2013, the broad Standard and Poor s index of equity prices rose by 30 .

Central bankers cannot explain equity or housing prices and their movements any better than investors can.

And the lower prices lead to more negative equity and therefore to more defaults and foreclosures.

For example, falling home prices put more families in negative equity mortgages worth more than the home.

For example, falling home prices put more families in negative equity mortgages worth more than the home.

Economist Robert Schiller of Yale explained very clearly and at book length why US equity prices would fall.

As homeowners with large negative equity default, the foreclosed homes contribute to the excess supply that drives prices down further.

Structural concentration of incomes at the top is combining with easy money and a chase for yield, driving equity prices upward.

The rise in equity prices has not come with a contagious new era story, but rather a sigh of relief story.

By 2010, the fall in home prices will be close to 30 with 6.6 trillion of home equity destroyed and 21 million households 40 of the 51 million with a mortgage facing negative equity.

Equity prices and other risky assets have fallen sharply from their peaks of late 2007, but there are still significant downside risks.

Financial market deregulation in an un named country sets off a credit boom and an explosion in equity and real estate prices.

The only other significant channel to transmit QE to the real economy is the wealth effect of an equity market increase, but there is some circularity in the argument that QE3 will lead to a persistent rise in equity prices. If persistent asset reflation requires a significant GDP growth recovery, it is tautological to say that if equity prices rise enough following QE, the resulting increase in GDP from a wealth effect justifies the rise in asset prices.

Taming the Private Equity Locusts

They should ignore fluctuations in equity and housing prices, unless there is clear and compelling evidence of dangerous feedback into output and inflation.

Similarly, the gravity of weaker growth will most likely overcome the levitational effect on equity prices from more quantitative easing, particularly given that equity valuations today are not as depressed as they were in 2009 or 2010.

After all, participants in the housing and equity markets set prices with a view to prices in the bond market, so contagion from one long term market to another seems like a real possibility.

A few analysts got it right. Economist Robert Schiller of Yale explained very clearly and at book length why US equity prices would fall.

QE raises equity prices lowers long term interest rates causes currencies to depreciate and eases credit crunches, even when interest rates are near zero.

Indeed, when US equity prices reached astronomical levels in the late 1990s, the pundits and investment bankers trotted out their silly explanations and theories.

Banks often oppose higher equity asset ratios, because equity capital is more expensive than debt capital.

Moreover, you should care about equity.

The only other significant channel to transmit QE to the real economy is the wealth effect of an equity market increase, but there is some circularity in the argument that QE3 will lead to a persistent rise in equity prices.

As equity prices soared, they invented theories to justify the rise. Deeper analysis would have told them instead that the rise would be short lived.

But if a major flare up causes investors to lose confidence in low volatility, the bottom could fall out from under equity and housing prices.

The combination of higher equity and house prices raised households net worth in 2013 by 10 trillion, equivalent to about 60 of that year s GDP.

The volatility in equity prices in recent months has more to do with the peculiarities of China s stock markets than with the country s underlying economic fundamentals.

If persistent asset reflation requires a significant GDP growth recovery, it is tautological to say that if equity prices rise enough following QE, the resulting increase in GDP from a wealth effect justifies the rise in asset prices.

Pay equity? Yes. Absolutely a feminist issue.

And the lower prices lead to more negative equity and therefore to more defaults and foreclosures. It is not clear what will stop this self reinforcing process.

Speculators could have front run the bank in the markets, selling short, driving equity prices down, and forcing the French financial institution to sell into a bottomless pit.

Unemployment up. Housing values down. Equity markets down.

Prosperity with equity is important for the region.

retail prices.

retail prices.

Prices rise.

After all, while the previous rounds of US monetary easing have been associated with a persistent increase in equity prices, the size and duration of QE3 are more substantial.

They want low energy prices, not high energy prices.

Many countries tax systems hugely favor debt over equity.

Equity markets were subjected to disclosure and transparency requirements.

It is a matter of both equity and efficiency.

The equity bull market is now six years old.

Finally, public equity markets will have to be strengthened.